During the last years, several subjects have advanced claims for developing within the EU specific elements of what is often referred to as policies of memory. Whilst this trend could be perceived as one more instance of transference of domestic issues to the EU level, the distinctive trait of these claims is that claims on memory are associated both to justice and identity and, hence, they appeal to an underlying structure of normative justification. This paper examines these claims and discusses the normative argument supporting them. The argument revises, firstly, what are the policies of memory and, secondly, it discusses the relation between policies and politics towards the past in order to unveil the subjective component associated to recognition. The subjective dimension of recognition paves the way for asserting the location of victims as the most legitimate bearer of claims for recognition. The third section describes the very limited policies and politics of memory in the EU in order to enter, fourthly, into a deeper analysis of the new claims emerging in the post 2004 scenery. The argument elaborates then a theoretical frame which draws on the notion of "recognition order" of Honneth in order to establish the normative foundation for EU policies of memory. Being the EU a recognition order, claims referring memory cannot be legitimately excluded from the EU agenda. Nevertheless, legitimacy of claims for recognition does not mean that policies and proposals linked to these claims have automatic validity. Rather, policies must derive from EU wide deliberation on the claims and the proper policies to pursue having in mind a number of requirements. The conclusion sums up the argument.
What are the poliCies of memory?
Policies of memory refer to a specific variety or sub-type of policies towards the past or policies of history. Policies towards the past comprise all procedures, means and instruments for the selection, preservation and interpretation of facts from the past that are meaningful within a given political setting or community. 1 They exist in order to satisfy a moral requirement: they provide meaning to the past in terms which are meaningful for the current self-understanding of the community. Moral requirement and current self-understanding determine two basic traits of any policy towards the past (including of course policies of memory): they are contextually meaningful and they are selective. Facts are meaningful in the context of given community although certain facts (being the Holocaust the obvious example) may acquire universal significance. As for the selective dimension, not all past facts are meaningful nowadays and not all of them are meaningful in the same form. Selection tends to be biased and not neutral:
facts that portray successes, heroism and a positive view of the community are more prone to be selected that negative facts. 2 But even these negative facts (for instance, defeats) may play a role in glorifying the community or justifying its existence.
All political communities with a degree of political organizations implement some kind of policies towards the past not least because they fulfil a key function in identity building: by identifying facts in the past that are meaningful in the current moral self-understanding of the community, they establish continuity through time. Past facts (narrated and/or re-interpreted)
serve to re-create the community and give it a sense of coherence. Understanding the past and its demands on the present is precisely the function that nationally conscious individuals perform by means of a "collective, national memory" (Snyder: 2004: 50) . Myths, facts, symbols, suffering and heroism, repression and fate provide elements for representing the community through time and setting temporal yardsticks for identification. Naturally, when facts of the past and/or their meaning in the current self-understanding of the community and/or the community itself are disputed, policies turn into politics.
Naturally, the term past used until here is a very imprecise one that brings together "history"
and "memory". Tracing the difference between these two terms serves also to differentiate between policies of the past (or towards the past) or policies of history, on the one hand, and policies of memory, on the other. 3 These differences are the existing between "past", "history" 1 Droit refers to the ensemble of political, juridical, symbolic measures implemented by states and the work of memory assumed by actors of civil society (Droit; 2007: 102) 2 In this line, Stråth argues: collective memory is 'the result of a selective process of remembering and forgetting the past' and only exists where there is a group that remembers. The construction of a collective memory interacts with deep-rooted myths of the national community (Strǻth; 2005: 260) . 3 Aguilar defines policies of memory as "public (not necessarily political) initiatives which aim at diffusing or consolidating a given interpretation of a past event which has great relevance for certain social and/or political groups or for the whole of the country" (Aguilar; 2008: 53) . This definition leaves indeterminate the time frame to which memory refers: a past event covers anything between yesterday and prehistory. Contrariwise, this paper and "memory". Difficulties for comprehension appear because very often the word "memory" is used meaning exactly past or history. Used in this way, policies of the past and policies of memory mean the same. Conflating past/history in general, and memory, in particular, happens commonly because procedures for dealing personally with both are similar: remembering and learning. Tony Judt argues that unlike memory, which confirms and reinforces itself, history contributes to the disenchantment of the world (Judt; 2005: 830 ). Judt's argument is pointing in the direction of distinguishing between objective facts and subjective recollection even though this may be considered a thin one. But if the subjective/objective dimension is combined with a time frame, then differences may appear more clearly: memory implies that people communicate historical events and facts as part of their living experience or as part of the personal experience immediately transmitted to them by other live persons. In a real sense, it is erroneous to speak of memory when people alive in a giving community cannot communicate historical facts as part of their living experience or as part of the living experience personally convey to them by live (at the time the experiences were conveyed) relatives or acquaintances. Personal experience and personal involvement are part of memory.
Adhering strictly to this distinction allows differentiating between historical facts and facts of memory even accepting that the first may (or may not) include subjective elements. For instance, the American Civil War is a historical fact in the sense that no member of generations alive may have direct personal experiences of the event. It nevertheless may incorporate subjective referents in the form in which different people may interpret nowadays the facts and their significance for the community. On the contrary, the Vietnam War may be rightly perceived as a fact of memory additionally to its historical value in the sense that forms part of the living experience of some of the current generations. Naturally, the temporal frontier between both categories is difficult to precise.
Additionally, the collective significance of individual memories derives from their intersubjective dimension: individual memories of those who have directly lived an event contribute to the creation of a shared narrative when they interact with other individuals with which share same social or cultural adscription (Aguilar; 2008: 62) . The transmission of these shared narratives (which Aguilar calls collective or social memory) to the forthcoming generations transforms them into historical memory (Aguilar; 2008: 62) .
The transmission of narratives, memories, myths, etc. which are not strictly part of memory relies greatly on explicit (or implicit) policies of memory; i.e. policies that have the function of transferring through time narratives on facts filtered by specific community preferences.
Among these policies, some are memory-specific (i.e. policies designed with the only finality relates memory to personal subjective experience of past events. Implicitly, though, Aguilar distinguishes intuitively the subjective from the non subjective significance of past time and she uses for this purpose the reference to generations.
of transferring narratives about the past) and some are non specific (i.e. policies which have different functions but fulfil also indirectly a memorialising function). Among specific policies, policies of symbols are probably the most prolific arena for policies of memory and they involve both material symbols (such as monuments and memorials) and immaterial symbols, such as rituals and celebrations (commemoration dates and the way commemoration is made).
Awareness policies refer to initiatives to underline and emphasize the importance of certain facts or events. The specific instruments for these measures are very varied, involving films, exhibitions, conferences and seminars, etc. However, the most important policy of memory is a non-specific one: education policy which may as policy of memory through two different subjects; history and civic education. Teaching of history (and eventually geography) highlights specific historic facts and it contributes towards the creation of identity by projecting retrospectively the perception of the community in specific historical moments. Tracing these and recovering them creates a sense of continuity through time. In the field of education, a policy of memory can be indifferently constructed on facts selected which ether exalt the existing community (glorifying its successes) or underline their suffering and oppression.
States do normally posses a large number of policies through which a specific policy of memory can be implemented. In contrast (and before discussing the justification for these), it must be underlined that the EU has very scarce formal competences in the areas in which policies of memory can be constructed. On education (article 165.2 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), the Treaty establishes that the Union action shall be aimed at developing the European dimension in education but fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems (article 165.1). On culture (article 167.2), the treaty establishes that action by the Union shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas: improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples and conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance. Noticeably, the elimination of article I-8 of the EU Constitutional Treaty in the Lisbon Treaty provides a clue on the understanding that Member States assign to EU symbolic policies: whilst the elimination did not aim at an specific memorialisation content (such as the reference contained in the article to the date of 9 th May), it questioned the explicit attempt to construct a symbolic dimension at all. The Stockholm Programme confirmed this approach: Each Member State has its own approach towards dealing Stråth; 2005: 257) . For this, attention is paid to two different kinds of arguments: a normative and practical one which examines the claims made for recognising memory and a purely practical one which ponders the instrumental use of policies of memory.
Politics of memory I: Claims for recognition
The interaction between individual memories of experiences may not reach the level of public policy. The transition from interactive dimension to policies occurs when the subjects of memory make claims for recognition. Recognition is constitutive of subjectivity; one becomes an individual subject by virtue of recognition, and being recognised by, another subject (Fraser; 2003: 10) . Thus, when subjects claim the recognition of their subjective memories, they are demanding from the policy their full consideration as individuals by accepting personal experiences that determines deeply their subjectivity. For Fraser, recognition implies selfrespect, self-esteem and self-confidence. Recognition of memory in a given community restores persons' dignity by means of policies which take into account their claims. Recognition thus, is an essential component of policies of memory and politics of memory are the struggles for recognition of memory claims.
In a descriptive sense, several subjects may enter the political arena with different claims for recognition of memory. Claimants aim at policies recognising their memory experiences. Now, moving to a normative standpoint, this requires identifying the criteria that determines which are the legitimate claims for recognition of personal experiences. Naturally, the legitimacy of claims for recognition depends on the type of regime. Policies of memory happen both in democratic and non democratic polities. In fact, repressive regimes use intensively instruments such as education and symbolic policies. In empirical terms, there may not be substantive differences in the way either democratic and repressive regimes dealt with the issues of past and memory, but in normative terms, a deep difference emerge: democratic politics of memory must be compatible with the genetic code of democracy, implying human rights, rule of law and rulers' accountability. Policies of memory in democratic policies necessarily require establishing compatibility between moral standards of self-comprehension of the community (along principles such as respect of human rights, rule of law, fairness, justice, etc.) and the experience of persons of generations alive. Following Honneth, claims for recognition which are morally legitimate or defensible must point in the direction of a societal development that we can grasp as coming closer to our notions of a good or just society (Honneth; 2004: 353) .
Claims for recognition based on personal experience find a pretension of legitimacy if they do not infringe these requirements, if they are able to fulfil the check list of conformity with high standards of human rights, rule of law, accountability. In democratic politics, furthermore, it may be assumed that claims fulfilling these normative requirements must compete for asserting themselves (at least they are already constitutionally sanctioned).
Among the possible legitimate claims for recognition in democratic polities, those of persons alive who suffered the facts as victims are particularly relevant. Todorov writes that the old victim has an unlimited right to sate his claim and demand his due; in taking up this position, he assures himself his own gratification (Todorov; 1995: 131) .
5 They saw their dignity violated and, taking into account repressive nature of the regimes, due process and respect of rights were conspicuously absent. Thus, the attention to victims is not only an act of justice but also an act of reasserting the basic values sustaining democratic policies. In contrary sense, claims for recognition of perpetrators cannot and do not play a role in policies of memory in democratic polities (at least they express regret, at least they may have exemplifying value or at least they can present themselves as victims).
Whilst claims for recognition deserve always attention, two caveats must be introduced. The first is that not all forms of victimhood can be equally treated: massive murder and torture represent a superior form of denigration and elimination of human dignity whilst deprivation of property or employment carries a different level of suffering. Mechanisms for dealing with these later categories of victims do not usually pass in fact mainly through politics of memory but through reparations. The second caveat refers to the eventual policy actions that may be taken: these do not derive automatically from these claims but rather they must be discussed and argued in a given political context. In democratic contexts, deliberation between publics (encapsulated in parliamentary form) mediates between claims and policies.
Politics of memory II: The partisan use of memory
A second dimension in which policies of memory become politics of memory refers to their use. Any policy of memory has the effect of shaping historical perceptions of the community and this is particularly important taken in combination with the selection bias mentioned above. The selection of specific memory items will condition the model of community which is meant to convey. Memory can be put at the service of a political programme for instance of nation building. And selection bias goes also for that which is not identified as part of memory: as Renan put it, forgetting, I would go as far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in 5 Todorov warns on possible excesses linked to the temptation for anyone to identify herself with the role of victim in a long term basis, since the status has some "advantages": few material compensations but particularly, the moral claim mentioned above: in taking the position as claim maker, he assures himself on his own gratification (i.e. the right to complain). the creation of a nation; thus, the progress of historical studies is often a danger for national identity…the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things (Ernst Renan, quoted in Judt; 2005: 803) . Narratives and myths contribute to construct an element of identification with a community and, in this sense, they contribute to the creation of a sense of belonging. Müller summarises a point in which most authors would agree: national collective memory serves as a frame for nationally minded individuals to place and organize their histories in a wider context of meaning, this forming collective identity (Müller; 2004: 3) . Policies of memory thus contribute to the delimitation of the borders of the perceived community and they serve to reinforce the solidarity among its members. This seems particularly evident in the case of commemorations: "commemoration activity" usually serves to strengthen the feeling of community and solidarity among those commemorating -a solidarity that is not necessarily based on consensus over the past events, but it rather extends to several generations, social classes and political events (Gillis; .
Because of this identity and solidarity creating function, they are politically very attractive to flesh out specific partisan programmes. The subjective and interactive element of politics of memory implies also an emotional capability: facts which relate to their experience or the experience of their close relatives can move people. And these emotions can be used, abused and manipulated politically in a very instrumental sense, for instance, to reinforce national identity. Hence, the temptation to convert history in memory (or, in other words, activating historical facts as components of current living generations' personal experiences) may appear because of the mobilising potential of memory. Transforming historical facts into memory allows the activation of passions connected to memory. "The discourse about the past is, in many cases, only the encoded and masked form of a contemporary political debate, a proxy struggle, conducted in historical costume" (Schögel; 2004: 7) . Appropriate remembrance and historical writing is based on an act of recognition of preceding generations. It is we, the living, who give the dead their voices-or refuse to; because they have fallen silent, they can only speak with our help (Schögel; 2004: 9) .
Successful transformation of policies towards the past or policies of history into the more specific and also subjectively more intense policies of memory has a large premium: the moral high requirements placed on the later are invested on the former. Additionally, transformation of historical facts into memory facts activate the personal subjective dimension of memory and, in this way, it may activate the subjective components of personality such as passions.
politiCs of memory iN the eU pre 2004
As with many other institutions and policies, the reflection and design of policies of memory refers to states, something that the EU is not. The arguments for which states implement policies of memory have been implicitly exposed above. If the question is referred to the EU, explanatory arguments (responding to the question why the EU is developing some sort of policies of memory) and normative arguments (why the EU should develop them) may appear conflated.
Historically, the political context of creation of the European Communities paid smaller attention to policies of memory and, on the other hand, it had a different moral orientation than nowadays.
In the aftermath of WWI (when the Union was created), Western Europe states' strategy for dealing with memory was universal neglect of Holocaust with a parallel victimization of the nation (Austrian, Belgian, Dutch nation).
6 In words of Droit, social consensus in post 1945 West
European societies relied very much on the myth of resistance (Droit; 2007: 203) . Only in the 1960s, a series of war crimes trials in some European states put in the forefront the memory of the Holocaust. According to Tony Judt, by the end of the XX century, the centrality of the Holocaust in Western European identity and memory seemed secure (Judt; 2005: 820) . EvaClarita Onken, refers similarly two to three European memory regimes being the first two the consensus on Germany's sole guilt for the atrocities and the war and the Holocaust, and the historical myth of national resistance and victim status of all occupied countries. These two myths entailed a large scale "collective amnesia". Since the 1970s, another common unifying memory was found in the Holocaust as the singular act of barbarians, against which European unity was to be strengthened and made irreversible (Onken; 2007: 31 Giandomenico Majone disputes the well established belief that peace is the greatest achievement of the integration process. He expresses his doubts on the causal role of European integration in this achievement and, in his view, this is largely a fiction, another instance of past hoc, ergo proper hoc, fallacy (Majone; 2009:81) . He further quotes Hirschmann who writes that the EC had arrived too late to claim to have averted further wars between European countries (Hirschmann; 1981:266-284) . In the same vein, Della Salla argues that for the correlation between both peace and European integration to be true, it requires to believe a certain (mythical) story of European integration (della Salla; 2010: 6). 9
Thus, Timothy Snyder wrote that the EU is, alter all, built upon the premise that totalitarianism must not return . 10
Although not an EU institution, PACE constructed an argument on the CoE special responsibility on preventing the resurgence of Nazi ideology that may apply exactly to the EU: Modern Europe has been conceived on the basis of a total rejection of Nazi ideas and principles, to ensure that such horrendous crimes as these committed by the Nazi regime in the name of "racial superiority" will never be repeated. PACE Resolution 1495 Mediterranean enlargement that the EU anticipated through the formulation of a strong implicit conditionality policy: Member States must be democratic and respect human rights. However, none of the three new member states brought in claims for recognition related to policies of memory which challenged the predominant narrative on the past within the EU. And, finally, the 1996 enlargement brought into the EU states whose eventual claims might be perfectly aligned with those of existing members. None of these rounds of enlargement challenged the foundational narrative of the EU and, hence, the self-understanding of the community (of states and peoples).
NeW Claims for reCogNitioN iN the eU
This situation changed after the 2004 Eastern enlargement. Although the EU lacked of a explicit formalised position on the issue, there was, firstly, an implicit pressure on Central and Eastern
European applicants for recognition of the Holocaust as part as their policies of memory. Droit has termed this as the "Copenhagen memorial criterion": the implicit understanding that recognition of Holocaust was a sine qua non of accession (Droit; and EU (in particular) policies, there was also a reaction.
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The overarching claim, in a nutshell, is one of equal recognition: in the view of its proponents, the dominant narrative on European history (as reflected by education, symbolic practices and awareness initiatives) reflects predominantly (and for some only exclusively) the experiences of the Western part of the continent whilst the historical experience of central and Eastern
European countries has not been included. Thus, citizens, intellectuals and politicians from
Central and eastern European countries demand the recognition of their facts of memory. In some cases, these arguments have been very crudely put and constructed as a questioning of existing Western-perceived narratives and challenging broadly accepted claims for recognition. Whilst the Commission adopted a cautious approach on the topic, the European Association of History Teachers (EUROCLIO) endorsed enthusiastically the proposal arguing that a nationcentric approach still dominates history teaching leading to poor understanding of shared and common experiences. 24 The PACE Resolution 1652 (2009) on attitude to memorials exposed to different historical interpretations in Council of Europe member states set the CoE policy. The
PACE affirmed its belief that disputes related to divergent interpretations of history can only be
resolved with time through a process specific to each nation. http://www.euroclio.eu/site/. Euroclio's overall aim is to promote and support the development of history education so that it strengthens peace, stability, democracy and critical thinking runs several projects with different geographical and thematic areas. In 2009, it launched an inquiry on the teaching of common European history whose results will be presented to the Annual Conference in Nijmegen, the Netherlands on March 22-28 2010.
A fifth claim refers to memorialisation policies. The PACE Recommendation 898 (1980) suggested the conservation of "monuments set up by invaders or by a regime regarded as 
25
The repertoire of claims for recognition is not by any means closed: it can not be discharged that future EU member states may introduce new claims for recognition related to their own experiences (for instance, the Balkans applicants may bring with them significant claims in this domain). In 2006, the EP asked Turkey to recognise the Armenian genocide hinting that it could eventually become a precondition for accession. Although the issue has never been an explicit condition for accession, some Member States have advanced parliamentary resolutions in this direction which may create burdens and, thus, implicitly they may turn into an accession requirement.
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In summary, the new emerging claim coincides around a demand for a new narrative that accepts that during four decades eastern Europeans had to experience communist subjugation rather than European integration 2005: 3) . 27 This claim contains also an implicit challenge 
strUggliNg for reCogNitioN: a Normative argUmeNt for eU poliCies of memory
All these claims, petitions and demands show a transformation of the traditional perception of European institutions in general and the EU in particular. They show that actors conceive increasingly the EU as a relevant site for recognition of identity and rectification of injustice and they aim their claims to the Union. As far as policies of memory goes, the EU is increasingly becoming a recognition order, a framework within which individuals and groups are learning to see themselves recognised with respect to certain categories.
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The emergence of a struggle for recognition of claims means that memory has entered EU in each society and in respect to which political success or progress is primarily measured, while others are marginal or "outside" of politics (Offe; 1987: 66) .
With enlargement, citizens, groups, social movements, and states come with expectations and hopes, and with a history of structured expectations of recognition and of recognition denied (Fossum; 2005: 140) . Among these, a prevalent expectation for recognition among constituencies of new Member States refers to their differential perception of European events after 1945 and the elements that may enter a common European memory. These can be constructed and/or perceived as conflicts but, as Hirschmann rightly argues, conflicts refer to notions of justice. In societies with freedom of speech and association, concerns about (newly emerging inequalities and sectoral or regional declines) tend to mobilise both those who are immediately affected as well as citizens who are sensitive to more or less widely shared feelings about social justice.
Here, there arise demands for corrective action and reform, demands that are based both on selfinterest and genuine concern for the public good. (Italics in the original) (Hirschmann; 1994:
212).
Hence, arguments of justice impede rejecting that the EU may become a site for conflict and, eventually, recognition of politics of memory: Withholding some recognition held to be legitimate is a source of social injustice (Honneth; 2004: 352) . In the view of its members, societies represent legitimate order structures only to the degree that they are in a position to guarantee reliable relations of mutual recognition at various levels (Honneth; 2004:354) .
Functionally, access can help to settle claims and, conversely, denial of access or strong biases in access can exacerbate recognition problems, as claimants can come to see lack of access as a denial of recognition (Fossum; 2005: 138) .
What makes the EU the legitimate community for recognition of claims? One argument builts on the idea of shared guilt (i.e. all European states took part in the Holocoaust (Pijpers; .
In this sense, there might be a differential attitude to the claims coming from former Soviet regimes: la communauté de mémoire des victimes du national-socialisme comprend toute l'Europe alors que l'URSS n'a soumis que l'Europe de l'Est à sa terreur et a sa domination (Droit; 2007: 105) . Apart from the accuracy of the description, this argument relies on the notion of "extended responsibility" which is intuitively consistent with intuitive notions of community. De Greiff, nevertheless, has identified a substantial weakness from the theoretical point of view: the difficulty to morally transfer debts between generations and, what is more important, how the dead can be proper recipients of present obligations (de Greiff; 2002: 22) .
A second criticism adds weight to this: how moral obligation can travel through space? De
Greiff proposes an alternative foundation of the "duty to remember" (which can be extended to policies of memory) which is based on the notion of trust: the duty to remember is justified because is a way to gain the trust of these whose ancestors were victimised. The duty is thus towards our fellow citizens, it is a duty towards the present. This scheme fits with the current configuration of the EU community: Even without being a national community, the EU is a community of citizens constructed around rights and duties as defined by the statute of EU citizenship and the requirements of pertinence to the EU: respect for human/fundamental rights and democracy. As de Greiff rightly argues, interpersonal trust is essential for the cooperation with strangers that is a pre-requisite for large scale political organisation on which modern democracies are bases (de Greiff; 2002: 28 
Spanish former communist and Buchenwald concentration camp survivor Jorge Semprún in his
Discourse at the Weimar National Theatre at the 60 th anniversary of the liberation of the camp argued that EU enlargement could only succeed both culturally and existentially "when we have shared and united our memories".
The argument emerging is that claims for recognition cannot be ignored because of reasons of justice and, hence, policies of memory going beyond the current status quo in the EU may be required. Policies, though, are not an automatic result of claims. Claims for recognition do not imply automatic acceptance of the consequences that claimants associated to them. Rather, claims have to be received, grounded in the addressed community and, after the process of subjective interaction that recognition requires, policies will appear as response to the interaction. This is particularly important when states are the claim makers: accepting the legitimacy of their claims for recognition does not imply automatic acceptance of the policy proposals associated to these claims. The identification of the EU as a site for recognition of claims does not spare the requirement of the intersubjective assumption of claims. Claims for recognition within the EU have to be debated by individuals if they are to be effectively recognised. Now, the EU has an imperfect public sphere and deliberation of citizens on these kin of claims cannot be realistically expected. The proxy for this intersubjective deliberation is of course, institutional debate and discussion, out of which eventually a policy of memory may emerge. 
